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THE BATTLE FOR OIL: FIGHTING THROUGH
CORRUPTION & CHANGING SOCIO-ECONOMIC
LANDSCAPES TO WIN OVER AFRICA’S
BIGGEST GIANTS
MODUPE ADAMOLEKUN*
Topic Introduction
For many years, economic scholars paid little attention to the future of
Africa.1 The continent was largely overlooked and wholly characterized
with post-colonial perceptions of political unrest, corruption, religious
bloodbaths, and civil strife. 2 With the passage of time however, nations
soon discovered that Africa was deeply imbued with rich natural resources
and possessed a huge potential for growth. For example, in 2018, Africa
produced more than 78% of the world’s platinum3, 46% of the world’s
* Modupe Adamolekun is a law student at the University of Oklahoma, College of
Law and on track to graduate in May 2021. Prior to law school, she worked as an accountant
and financial analyst for a few years. While in law school, Modupe held different leadership
positions and was a recipient of multiple awards and scholarships. Modupe would like to
dedicate this Comment to God first, and her family for being a strong pillar of support.
1. Hopeless Africa, THE ECONOMIST (May 11, 2013), https://www.economist.
com/leaders/2000/05/11/hopeless-africa.
2. See Marieme Jamme, Negative Perception Slow Africa’s Development, THE
GUARDIAN (10 Dec. 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/povertymatters/2010/dec/10/africa-postcolonial-perceptions (last visited Sept. 20, 2019).
3. U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2019, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
INTERIOR, https://prd-wret.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/assets/palladium/production/atoms/
files/mcs2019_all.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2019).

607

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020

608

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 5

diamond4, and 19% of the world’s gold.5 Africa’s oil, although only
accounting for around 8.6% of the world’s total production, has notably
stood out among the plethora of Africa’s natural resources, and caused a
scurry of developed nations racing toward Africa, in what some
interestingly labeled the “Second Scramble for Africa.”6
With the need for African oil undeniable, Africa experienced an inflow
of foreign direct investments (“FDI”), which in turn contributed to a
revived economy throughout the continent. 7 This revived economy, along
with improved healthcare and revamped infrastructure, created a renewed
outlook on the once bleak prediction of Africa’s future. 8 However, lurking
behind the façade of outstretched arms and a revamped economy is a reality
much too grim to ignore. The truth is that the fight for oil in Africa is
intricately intertwined with corruption, and inextricably interwoven with
manipulative conduct that continues to insulate many of Africa’s tyrannical
leaders.

4. Production Statistics, DIAMOND PRODUCERS ASS’N, https://diamondproducers.com/
diamond-industry/productionstats/ (last visited Sep. 19, 2019).
5. GFMS Gold Survey 2018, THOMSON REUTERS, http://images.financial-risksolutions.thomsonreuters.info/Web/ThomsonReutersFinancialRisk/%7B87eb3342-8e4844af-937e-7ad3264c2199%7D_Gold_Survey_2018_Final_Version_-_GS18_-_Compressedmin.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2019).
6. BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019, BRITISH PETROLEUM, https://www.
bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/
statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2019-full-report.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2019)
[hereinafter BP Energy Stats]; See, Katy Marriott, The ‘Second Scramble’ for Africa,
GEOGRAPHICAL (Nov. 20, 2014), http://geographical.co.uk/geopolitics/geopolitics/item/411african-land-grab; Shantikumar V. Nair, The Second Scramble For Africa, HUFFPOST (Sept.
29, 2015), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-second-scramble-for-africa_b_8216990; The
New Scramble for Africa, THE ECONOMIST (May 7, 2019), https://www.economist.com/
leaders/2019/03/07/the-new-scramble-for-africa.
7. See Elizabeth Asiedu, Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: The Role of Natural
Resources, Market Size, Government Policy, Institutions and Political Instability, WORLD
ECONOMY (Jan. 10, 2006) https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.14679701.2006.00758.x.
8. Africa Rising – The Hopeful Continent, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 3, 2011), https://
www.economist.com/leaders/2011/12/03/africa-rising; see also Sibusiso Sgwane, Africa Is
Not A Hopeless Continent, HUFFPOST (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/africais-not-a-hopeless_b_9166084; Fareed Zakaria, Major World Economies Are Becoming
Increasingly Isolationist. Except Those In Africa, THE WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2019), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/major-world-economies-are-becoming-increasinglyisolationist-except-those-in-africa/2019/08/29/5501ec28-ca9d-11e9-a4f3-c081a126de70_
story.html.
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A deeper dive into the issues above is discussed in this comment, and
broken down into four parts. Part I explores the history, discovery and
scope of Africa’s massive oil reserves, focusing on the largest oil producers
in Sub Saharan Africa (“SSA”), a group made up of the top five African
countries, which cumulatively contribute to around 70% of current oil
production within Africa.9
Part II delves into the nature of the undertakings of the world’s largest oil
consumers in Africa, through International Oil Companies (“IOC”). Special
focus will be on the United States and China, which together accounts for
about 33% of the world’s total oil consumption. 10
Part III analyzes the misuse of investments and natural resource revenues
in Africa. Specifically, this comment addresses the different types of
corruptions, and African’s perception of its wide spread nature.
Furthermore, part III will link the battle for oil with the different vehicles of
corruption used by Africa’s leaders, and the consequences of corruption on
Africa’s economy like the deepening divide in Africa’s socio-economic
sphere.
Finally, Part IV unveils proposed solutions to combat corruptions.
Initiatives such as the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and
resolutions like UN Convention Against Corruption provide some ways to
tackle the pandemic effect corruption has on the economy. Other solutions
include leadership change, global corporate regulations and judicial
accountability. These are avenues Africans could use to curtail the spread of
corruption, and suppress the rapacious appetite of Africa’s leaders.
Although this article is mainly focused on Africa, this paper will also
examine the implications of Africa’s oil industry practices in the American
economy. Many African economies have a near total dependency on oil,
thus any change in the oil industry, whether good or bad, inevitably
reverberates not only to other industries, but also to other nations. This is
why addressing corruption in Africa’s oil and gas industry is especially
important.
Although there are different articles on corruption in Africa, or African
oil industry, there is a dearth of research papers with an in-depth discussion
of how the two are linked, or the varied ways corruption is promulgated.
Transparency in the oil industry is crucial because different IOCs transfer
9. BP Energy Stats, supra note 6, at 16.
10. Id.; see also What Countries Are the Top Producers and Consumers of Oil?, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=709&t=6 (last visited
Sept. 20, 2019).
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funds to host governments in exchange for doing business in the host
country. These funds should benefit the host country’s inhabitants and
propel economic development; however, this does not appear to be the case
in Africa. This phenomenon is aptly known as the ‘oil curse’ where
resource rich countries, are performing worse than their counterparts.
Thus, this paper overall brings a much-needed outlook on the battle for oil,
and fighting through corruption in Africa’s socio-economic landscape.
II. History, Discovery & Scope Of African Oil Reserves
To fully understand the pervasiveness of corruption in many of Africa’s
oil rich countries, one must revisit the history and scope of oil in Africa.
The focus of this article is on the top oil producing countries in SSA such as
Nigeria, Angola, Algeria.11 Although these countries share similarities in
their approaches to oil governance, each country continues to grapple with
its own unique set of challenges. Oil, for the purpose of this paper, includes
shale oil, crude oil, condensates and natural gas liquids.
A. Identifying Africa’s Largest Oil Producers
1. Nigeria
Nigeria is the largest oil and gas producer in SSA. 12 In 1956, inside
Nigeria’s Bayelsa state, Shell-BP discovered oil in commercial quantities at
Oloibiri field.13 The discovery catapulted Nigeria into the oil industry, and
ended its agricultural-based economy. Shortly after, in 1958, the Oloibiri
field came on stream and began producing 5,100 barrels per day. 14 In 1960,
Nigeria extended to other foreign nations the exploration rights to adjoining
states.15 And more than a decade after the first oil production, Nigeria
became a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (“OPEC”) in 1971.

11. BP Energy Stats, supra note 6, at 16.
12. Nigeria, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., (May 23, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/beta/
international/analysis.php?iso=NGA.
13. History of the Nigerian Petroleum Industry, NIGERIAN NAT’L PETROLEUM CO.,
https://www.nnpcgroup.com/NNPC-Business/Business-Information/Pages/IndustryHistory.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
14. Id.
15. Id.
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Nigeria is known for its light and “sweet” (low sulfur) high grade quality
of oil.16 The country “produces probably the best quality of crude in
abundance . . . .”17 A lower level of sulfur in crude oil makes the oil cheaper
and easier to refine, when compared with oil found in the Middle East,
which may be “sticky.”18 Sticky oil is a characteristically viscous class of
oil found in medium to heavy crudes. 19
Nigeria’s trade partners are largely in Europe and Asia.20 The United
States, once Nigeria’s largest oil importer, no longer needed Nigerian oil
after it discovered an abundance of shale oil in its own backyard. 21
Nigeria’s economy is largely dependent on oil, with crude oil accounting
for 76% of exports in 2017. 22 Surpassing its initial production, Nigeria
produced around 672 million barrels in 2017, and currently has
approximately around 30.1 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, with 30%
located on shore, and 70% offshore.23
Nigeria’s oil production and capacity may paint a thriving economic
picture, but the country is not without its woes. The Oloibiri oil discovery
has been both a blessing and a curse. Although Nigeria’s 2017 oil exports
made it the 49th largest export economy in the world, militant attacks and
various forms of corruption, all contributed to Nigeria’s rank as the 124 th of
126 most complex economy. 24 An economy that is too complex to navigate
is a deterrent for foreign investment. Different forms of corruption such as
oil theft, infrastructure sabotage, and bribery are part of the various
challenges surrounding Nigeria’s business climate that contribute to the

16. Africa’s Oil & Gas Scene After the Boom: What Lies Ahead, OXFORD ENERGY
FORUM, https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/OEF-117.pdf?
v=7516fd43adaa, (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) [hereinafter Oxford Energy Forum].
17. Id. at 10.
18. Chris Nwachukwu Okeke, The Second Scramble for Africa’s Oil and Mineral
resources: Blessing or Curse, 42 INT’L LAW 193, 200 (2008) [hereinafter, CN Okeke].
19. See Types of Crude Oil, U.S. ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/
emergency-response/types-crude-oil (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
20. .Where Does Nigeria Export Crude Petroleum to? (2017), THE OBSERVATORY OF
ECON. COMPLEXITY, https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/nga/show/2709/
2017/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
21. Oxford Energy Forum, supra note 16, at 13.
22. Nigeria, THE OBSERVATORY OF ECON. COMPLEXITY, https://oec.world/en/profile/
country/nga/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) [hereinafter OEC Nigeria].
23. Oil and Gas State of Play, DELOITTE, (Nov. 2018), https://www2.deloitte.com/
content/dam/Deloitte/xe/Documents/energy-resources/africa_oil_gas_state_of_play_Nov
2018.pdf [hereinafter Deloitte State of Play].
24. See OEC Nigeria, supra note 22.
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nature of Nigeria’s complex economy. 25 The last major foreign direct
investment in Nigeria was in 2014.26 The volatile oil industry, aging oil
fields along with the scarcity of new FDI has exacerbated the steady decline
of Nigeria’s resources, falling 15% between 2010-17. 27
2. Angola
Angola is SSA’s second-largest oil producer.28 In 1955, Angola
discovered oil in its Kwanza (Cuanza) Basin.29 Similarly to Nigeria, Angola
also produces a ‘sweet’ quality of oil, and is a member of OPEC.30 Angola
has approximately 17.6 billion barrels of oil resources, with 95% located
offshore, and many more offshore and deep-water oil projects slated to
commence in the upcoming decade. 31
China, India, and the United States are the top trading importers of
Angola’s crude oil. 32 China accounts for 67%, India 11%, and the U.S.
8.3%.33 Angola’s upstream sector, which mainly deals with exploration and
production activities, dominates Angola’s oil and gas industry, but its
refining capacity in the midstream sector severely lags behind in consumer
demand. Angola only has one refinery facility in Luanda with a capacity of
65,000 barrels per day, however, it currently produces fewer than 40,000
barrels per day. 34 Furthermore, Angola’s top import in 2017 was refined
petroleum, indicative of Angola’s lack of refinery infrastructures. 35
It is unsurprising that Angola is also an oil-dependent economy, and thus
highly susceptible to oil price fluctuations. Much like its other SSA oil
25. See Oxford Energy Forum, supra note 16.
26. Deloitte State of Play, supra note 23.
27. Id.
28. Angola – Oil and Gas, EXPORT.GOV, (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.export.
gov/article?id=Angola-Oil-and-Gas.
29. Background Reference: Angola, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 7, 2019),
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Angola/background
.htm [hereinafter EIA Angola].
30. EXPORT.GOV, supra note 30; see also, Angola Facts and Figures, ORG. OF THE
PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES, https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/147.htm
(last visited Oct. 20, 2019) [hereinafter OPEC Angola].
31. Deloitte State of Play, supra note 23; EIA Angola, supra note 28.
32. EIA Angola, supra note 28.
33. Where Does Angola Export Crude Oil to?, THE OBSERVATORY OF ECON.
COMPLEXITY,
https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/ago/show/2709/2017/
(last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
34. Deloitte State of Play, supra note 23.
35. See Angola, THE OBSERVATORY OF ECON. COMPLEXITY, https://oec.world/en/
profile/country/ago/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) [hereinafter OEC Angola].
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producing counterparts, Angola’s economy was impacted by the 2014 oil
crash, when the price of oil nosedived from a peak of $115 in June 2014 to
a record low of $35 per barrel in February 2016. 36 With crude petroleum
accounting for a bulk of its exports,37 a negative slew of consequences,
most notably, a lack of new FDI, flowed from the oil bust. 38 Because oil
prices were discouragingly cheap, oil companies were not inclined to invest
in Angola’s oil and gas (“O&G”) industry.
The Sociedade Nacional de Combustíveis de Angola (“Sonangol”) is
Angola’s powerful state-owned oil company. 39 Sonangol is likely a key
reason IOCs are hesitant to invest in Angola’s oil industry. 40 Created in
1976, Sonangol controls Angola’s O&G sector.41 In November of 2017,
Joao Lourenco displaced Jose Filomeno Dos Santos as president. Dos
Santos held the presidency for thirty-eight years.42 Sonangol’s previous
governance contributed to Angola’s 2017 ranking as the 117 th most
complex economy. 43 Under the new governance by Lourenco, Sonangol
underwent major leadership change. 44 Lourenco removed different relatives
and subordinates of Dos Santos from key positions of power in an attempt
to control the corruption and nepotism that had permeated Angola’s
government.45 For example, Lourenco replaced Zenu Dos Santos from his
position as the head of Sonangol. 46 Shortly after his displacement, Zenu was
charged with corruption when he attempted to transfer $1.5 billion to a
Swiss bank account. The money purportedly was part of a scheme to cover
up fraudulent investment decisions. 47

36. Kenneth Rogoff, What’s Behind the Drop in Oil Prices?, WORLD ECON. FORUM,
(Mar. 2, 2016) https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/03/what-s-behind-the-drop-in-oilprices/.
37. OEC Angola, supra note 35.
38. Deloitte State of Play, supra note 23.
39. Sonangol E.P., INST. OF EXP. & INT’ L TRADE, http://www.angola.doingbusiness
guide.co.uk/market-experts/sonangol-ep/, (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
40. Id.
41. See Oxford Energy Forum, supra note 16.
42. Antonio Cascais, Angola: The Fall of the Dos Santos Clan, DEUTSCHE WELLE,
https://www.dw.com/en/angola-the-fall-of-the-dos-santos-clan/a-45646757 (last visited Oct.
20, 2019).
43. OEC Angola, supra note 35.
44. Oxford Energy Forum, supra note 16.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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3. Algeria
Right on Angola’s heel is Algeria, another SSA key player. Algeria
commercially discovered oil in 1956 through the Edjelleh and Hassi
Messaoud oil fields.48 Territorially, Algeria is the largest country in Africa
and has been OPEC’s largest member country, since joining in 1969. 49
Algeria’s estimated 12.2 billion barrel of crude oil reserves, and six current
active refineries, contributed to the country’s ability to produce 618,000
barrels per day in 2018. 50
Like its counterparts, Algeria is an oil-dependent economy because the
country relies heavily on hydrocarbon production revenue. 51 Petroleum gas
(42%), crude petroleum (34%), and refined petroleum (18%) all make up
Algeria’s top three 2017 exports, effectively making the O&G industry
Algeria’s economic backbone. 52 Trading destinations for Algeria’s exports
are Europe and Eurasia (57%), Western Hemisphere (21%) and AsiaPacific regions (21%).53
Although Algeria is currently experiencing production stagnation, this
region still has huge potential. Perhaps due to the Algeria’s massive
landmass, around two-thirds of prospective acreage is still underexplored or
unexplored. 54
Sonatrach, Algeria’s state-owned hydrocarbon company, is the largest
company in Africa and controls around 80% of hydrocarbon production. 55
Given the amount of underexplored areas in Algeria, Sonatrach has
announced a focus on exploration and production activities of the upstream
sector, which hopefully should also bolster new FDI for the country. 56

48. Algeria Facts and Figures, ORG. OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES, https://
www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/146.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) [hereinafter
OPEC Algeria].
49. Id.
50. Algeria Executive Summary, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., (Mar. 25, 2019),
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.php?iso=DZA [hereinafter EIA Algeria].
51. Id.
52. Algeria, THE OBSERVATORY OF ECON. COMPLEXITY, https://oec.world/en/profile/
country/dza/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) [hereinafter OEC Algeria]; see also OPEC Algeria,
supra note 50.
53. EIA Algeria, supra note 50.
54. Why Algeria?, ALGERIA OIL & GAS SUMMIT 2019, https://www.algeria-summit.com
(last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
55. Algeria – Oil and Gas – Hydrocarbons, INT’L TRADE ADMIN. (Jan. 31, 2019),
https://www.trade.gov/knowledge-product/algeria-oil-and-gas-hydrocarbons.
56. Id.
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4. Other Players
Apart from the top three oil producing countries in Africa, there are
many other established and rising players. For example, Egypt is the largest
producer of oil in Africa outside of OPEC, and Egypt boasts a long history
of involvement in Africa’s O&G industry. 57 Egypt’s key location in Africa,
plays a vital role in the transportation of oil and other resources between
continents.58 “The Suez Canal is an important transit route for oil and
liquified natural gas (LNG) shipment traveling northbound from the Persian
Gulf to Europe and North America, and for shipment traveling southbound
from North Africa and from countries along the Mediterranean Sea to
Asia.”59
Further examples include Libya, which lies east of Egypt. Libya holds
Africa’s largest crude oil reserves, which currently accounts for 38% of the
continent’s total.60 Many of these players are still battling with their own
struggles. For example, Egypt’s oil consumption severely outpaces its oil
production.61 This gap is partly due to aging oil fields, inadequate
infrastructure and a lack of new oil discoveries. 62 Libya, on the other hand,
is ridden with civil unrest and a tumultuous trading relationship with the
United States.63
II. Undertakings of the World’s Largest Oil Consumers in Africa
The world undeniably has a need for oil. Many by-products from crude
oil such as gasoline, diesel fuel, heating oil, and jet fuel, are used as energy
to fuel our daily lives.64 In this context, perhaps it is not surprising that the
world’s largest oil consumers are the United States and China, who

57. Egypt Overview, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 24, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/
beta/international/analysis.php?iso=EGY [hereinafter EIA Egypt]
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Libya Overview, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.eia.
gov/beta/international/analysis.php?iso=LBY (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) [hereinafter EIA
Libya].
61. EIA Egypt, supra note 57.
62. Id.
63. EIA Libya supra note 60.
64. Oil: Crude and Petroleum Products Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., (May
23, 2019),
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-and-petroleum-products/ (last visited
Oct. 20, 2019) (illustrating that crude oil by-products are used to fuel airplanes, cars, trucks,
and heat homes etc.)
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cumulatively account for 33% of the world’s total oil consumption. 65
China’s 1.44 billion inhabitants represents 19% of the world’s population
according to the latest United Nations survey. 66 The United States, though
nowhere near as populous as China, has an extraordinary high use of
petroleum products from crude oil. Petroleum remains the biggest U.S.
energy source. “In 2018, U.S. petroleum consumption averaged about 20.50
million barrels per day (b/d), which included about 1.2 million b/d of
biofuels.”67 Specifically, in the petroleum product sector, consumption of
motor gasoline accounted for 45%. 68 Given the large demand for oil, the
United States (historically), and China (more recently) have spearheaded
multiple FDI projects in Africa.
A. The Role of FDI and International Oil Companies
The concept of foreign direct investments is fairly common. “Foreign
direct investment is when a company owns another company in a different
country . . . [w]ith FDI, foreign companies are directly involved with dayto-day operations in the other country.”69 In terms of FDI inflow to Africa,
the continent still has a long way to go, because when compared with the
rest of the world, Africa’s FDI lags. 70 Nevertheless, according to the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”), through
2017, the United States is the third largest investor in Africa (preceded by
France and Netherlands), while China is the fifth largest investor in
Africa.71
Economists and scholars have advanced different theories behind what
drives FDI inflows to Africa. One theory combines three factors:
Ownership, Location, and Internalization. 72 Ownership answers the “why”
65. What Countries Are the Top Producers and Consumers of Oil?, supra note 10.
66. Population, UNITED NATIONS https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/popula
tion/index.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
67. Oil: Crude and Petroleum Products Explained - Use of Oil, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., (Oct. 3, 2019),
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-and-petroleum-products
/use-of-oil.php (last visited April. 26, 2020).
68. Id.
69. What is Foreign Direct Investment?, ECONOMY, https://www.ecnmy.org/learn/yourworld/globalization/foreign-direct-investment/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
70. Edward Marandu, et al., An Analysis of Trends in Foreign Direct Investment Inflows
to Africa, 10 INT’L J. BUS. ADMIN. 20, 29 (2018) [hereinafter Marandu FDI Trend].
71. Foreign Direct Investment to Africa Defies Global Slump, Rises 11% , UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, https://unctad.org/en/pages/
newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=2109 (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
72. Marandu FDI Trend, supra note 70, at 20.
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question, and speaks to the benefit a corporation gets by owning a special
asset like a brand or technical knowledge. 73 Location answers the “where”
question, and addresses the advantage one gets from setting economic
activities in a place due to natural characteristics. 74 Finally, internalization
determines the “how” question, and is the benefit a corporation gets from
undertaking a business activity in-house, instead of leaving it to the
market. 75 Together, these three factors make it desirable to undertake FDI,
and as such, it is not surprising that much of Africa’s FDI is concentrated
in resource-rich countries, and located primarily in the extractive sector. 76
In Africa, the top five oil producing countries on average account for 47%
of the FDI inflow from 1990 – 2016.77 Historically, extractive sectors are
the main recipients of FDI, with oil and petroleum as the main drivers.
Recently, other sectors like tertiary services have gained increasing
importance in the flow of FDI.78
1. China
Though China is the fifth largest investor in Africa, it has not always
been so. China’s aggressive move into Africa was due to China’s
unprecedented demand for oil, combined with the global response to the
9/11 attack on the United States. 79 The attack prompted China to reevaluate its dependence in the Middle East for oil (nearly 60% in 2001) by
looking for outside sources.80 China’s frontrunners into Africa were IOCs,
namely China National Petroleum Corporation (“CNPC”) and Sinopec. 81
Sinopec is a state-owned oil and gas company and was ranked second in
2019 Fortune Global 500 list, while CNPC, also a state-owned corporation,
was ranked 4th on the list.82 Thus, China’s foreign policy in Africa is largely
shaped by its IOC’s actions in deal making.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 22.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 28.
Id.
China’s Energy Footprint in Africa, INST. OF DEVELOPING ECONS. JAPAN EXTERNAL
TRADE ORG.,
https://www.ide.go.jp/English/Data/Africa_file/Manualreport/cia_07.html
(last visited Nov. 10, 2019) [hereinafter IDE-JETRO Energy Footprint].
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. China National Petroleum, FORTUNE, https://fortune.com/global500/2019/chinanational-petroleum/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
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China’s entrance into Africa was not altruistic, yet it’s entrance into
Africa was positively received by many of the continent’s leaders, partly
because China’s entrance coincided with African leader’s business
objectives. For example, China’s interest in Nigeria’s aligned with
Nigeria’s then president, Olusegun Obasanjo’, “Look-East policy.”83 The
Look-East policy signified the start of the alliance between Africa and Asia.
84
The inception of the Look-East policy resulted from the reports that
Western companies unfairly mistreated Nigerian companies.
Because China’s renewed venture into Africa is for oil exploitation, its
impact is concentrated in Africa’s largest oil-producing countries. However,
China continues to build a diplomatic relationship with the rest of Africa as
well. This renewed interest is marked with the creation of the Forum on
China-Africa Cooperation (“FOCAC”), which is an avenue that reflects
China’s foreign policy in Africa.85 FOCAC meetings are held every three
years, and the first of these meetings was held in Beijing on October, 2000.
86
Over 800 officials from both China and 44 African countries attended the
first meeting.87 The next meeting in 2003, was held in Ethiopia, and
attended by more than 70 government ministers from China, and 44 African
countries.
The China-Africa meetings were concomitant with different trade deals.
For example, key outcomes from the 2006 FOCAC meeting was the
establishment of China-Africa Development Fund, a deal valued at $5
billion, to encourage further Chinese investments in Africa. 88 Because
China was a late entry in Africa’s oil trade, China had to be creative in its
approach by offering unique benefits not already provided by its western
counterparts. For example, other China trade deals with Africa targeted
debt relief, political “non-interference” approach in Africa’s internal
policies, support for Africa in global forums, and competitive military deals
etc. 89 These deals and negotiations contributed to the notion that China
83. IDE-JETRO Energy Footprint, supra note 79.
84. Omolade Adunbi & Howard Stein, The Political Economy of China’s Investment in
Nigeria:
Prometheus
or
Leviathan?,
https://www.aeaweb.org/conference/2019/
preliminary/paper/RBfbBGFE (last visited Jan. 26, 2020) (prepared for the Association for
Evolutionary Ecomics Panel “The Political Economy of State Capitalism”).
85. The Role of FOCAC, INST. OF DEVELOPING ECONS. JAPAN EXTERNAL TRADE ORG.,
https://www.ide.go.jp/English/Data/Africa_file/Manualreport/cia_04.html (last visited Nov.
10, 2019) [hereinafter IDE-JETRO FOCAC]
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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viewed African countries as peers, and not as nations incapable of selfgovernance.
Unsurprisingly, most China and Africa trade relationship are oil-backed
transactions. For instance, in 2004, Angola delivered to China 10,000
barrels per day of crude oil in exchange for Chinese loan in the amount of
$2 billion repayable over 17 years at a low 1.5% interest rate. 90 In 2005,
China’s Ex-Im Bank agreed to help finance Nigeria’s construction of power
stations for approximately $300 million, and in exchange, CNPC secured a
deal to purchase 30,000 barrels of crude oil a day for one year.91 Many of
the China-Africa deals involve infrastructure agreements, and the
infrastructure construction has contributed to China’s influence in Africa in
both diplomatic and political operations. 92 “China’s role on the African
continent has been defined by the financing of more than 3,000, largely
critical, infrastructure projects.” 93
China’s overall trade relationship with Africa stands in stark contrast to
that of United States. “China [does] not view itself as superior but rather as
a partner.”94 In contrast, many have criticized the U.S. relationship with
Africa for its interventionist approach.95 And others have noted that the
U.S. views Africa as a continent in need of saving and thus the U.S. trade
deals with Africa comes with political and/or economic conditions.96 “The
West introduced stringent conditionalities in economic cooperation among
nations in order to realize their objective.” 97 China’s hands-off approach in
Africa’s internal affairs, likely indicates that China is not supporting many
of Africa’s corrupt government regime. 98

90. IDE-JETRO Energy Footprint, supra note 79.
91. Id.
92. Panos Mourdoukoutas, How China Beats America and Europe in Africa, FORBES
(Oct. 24, 2019) https://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2019/10/24/how-chinabeats-america-and-europe-in-africa/#6f6bb4ba6937 (comparing China’s strategies in Africa
to the U.S. and Europe).
93. .Witney Schneidman & Joel Wiegert, Competing in Africa: China, the European
Union, and the United States, BROOKINGS (April 16, 2018) https://www.brookings.edu/
blog/africa-in-focus/2018/04/16/competing-in-africa-china-the-european-union-and-theunited-states/ [hereinafter Brookings].
94. CN Okeke, supra note 18, at 199.
95. IDE-JETRO Energy Footprint, supra note 79.
96. See Ruth Gordon, The Environmental Implications of China’s Engagement with
Sub-Saharan Africa, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. 11-109 (Dec. 2012).
97. CN Okeke, supra note 18, at 195.
98. See Gordon, supra note 96, at 11-113.
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China’s involvement with Africa is however, not without its criticisms.
Because China’s FDI in Africa is centered in Africa’s top oil producing
countries, and most notably in the extractive sectors, there are different
environmental implications. Chinese oil companies are not bound by the
same environmental restrictions as the United States, therefore, China could
comparatively give less concern to environmental implications. The
international community have continuously raised concerns about China’s
inadvertent contribution to human rights issues, poor labor conditions, and
environmental degradation.99 Even China’s debt relief program in Africa is
under attack leading many countries to question its sustainability and its
potential crippling effects.100 Despite these criticisms however, there is no
doubt that China’s involvement in Africa through its FDI programs
indicates a long-term commitment to the continent.
2. The United States of America
United States’ interest in Africa is complex. To fully understand U.S.
relationship with Africa, a separate look at this country’s interesting history
with oil and foreign policy in the global stage is warranted. The U.S. first
experienced the black gold rush in the mid 1800s at the time of the
industrial revolution. 101 Though coal was initially the main source of
energy, tables inevitably turned with the extraction of oil in Pennsylvania in
1861, and the U.S. first exported shipment to London. 102 With more than
200 by products of oil in the market by the early 1900s, U.S. established its
prowess and was responsible for more than 85% of the world’s crude oil
production.103 Henry Ford’s invention of Model T car in 1908, and the
beginning of World War I and II further promulgated U.S. oil production. 104
Domestically, Americans consumed refined motor fuel, while
internationally, oil fueled ships, land vehicles, and planes provided an
energy source for warfare.105 “Oil thus became a key component in the
exercise of American hegemony over a relatively prosperous world order,

99. Id. at 11-114
100. Id.
101. Timeline: Oil Dependence and U.S. Foreign Policy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, https://www.cfr.org/timeline/oil-dependence-and-us-foreign-policy (last visited
Nov. 10, 2019) [hereinafter CFR Timeline].
102. Id. at 2.
103. Id. at 3.
104. Id. at 4–6.
105. Id.
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after an era in which an unstable balance of power produced two world
wars sandwiched around a global depression.” 106
However, though the U.S. commanded most of the world’s crude oil
production, the combination of America’s massive domestic demand, war
supply demand, and bleak survey reports of U.S. remaining oil supplies,
triggered American oil security fears, and prompted the United States to
look to outside sources for oil. 107 “In 1947, the United States became a netimporter of oil for the first time.” 108 Further threatening America’s
dominance in oil production and oil security fear, were discoveries of oil in
other areas of the world, most notably, Saudi Arabia.109
The discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia, and other Arab nations were
indicative of U.S. foreign policy centered on securing its oil future. “[W]ith
concerns growing about the diminishing U.S. oil production capacity,
President Franklin Roosevelt declare[d] Saudi oil vital to U.S. security and
provide[d] financial support.” 110 The U.S. also aided in Iran’s effort in
1953 to overthrow then Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq. 111And just a
year later, the new Iranian government agreed to an arrangement where
mainly U.S. companies managed Iran’s oil industry. 112
The combination of multiple oil discoveries along with U.S. massive
domestic oil production caused a proliferation of oil in the markets.
Because of the overabundance of oil, the U.S. slashed oil prices and created
import caps to better control oil prices. 113 However, this move only
protected U.S. markets, and Arab nations that depended heavily on oil
revenue were left with growing frustrations. This led to the creation of
OPEC.114 Though OPEC gained little attention at its inception, the
organization quickly expanded to include not only Arab nations, but other
African countries as well. The growth in OPEC size contributed to its
power and control of world’s oil market. “By the end of 1970s,

106.
(2012).
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Tyler Priest, The Dilemmas of Oil Empire, 99 JOURNAL OF AMERICAN HISTORY 236
CFR Timeline, supra note 101 at 6–7.
Priest, supra note 124 at 239.
CFR Timeline, supra note 101.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 136.
Id.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
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international oil companies [had] unfettered access to just 7 percent of the
world’s oil reserves, down from 85 percent in the 1960s.” 115
Further display of OPEC’s power and exposure of U.S. fragility in the oil
industry occurred with the 1973 oil embargo, after the U.S. supported Israel
in the Yom Kippur War.116 Arab nations retaliated against the U.S. by
blocking oil shipments. “More than the embargo itself, however, U.S.
policy and consumer responses to it created ‘panic at the pump’ and
inflamed the crisis at home.”117 The oil shortage in this period caused an
increase in crude oil prices, which sparked U.S. drilling explorations in
foreign nations such as West Africa.118 Thus, this period coincided with
many oil discoveries made in Africa. Years later, with the 9/11 attack on
U.S. soil, U.S. sought to reduce its dependence on Middle Eastern oil, and
protect against supply disruptions. “[T]he U.S. Department of Defense
established a new unified Africa Command to safeguard growing oil
production in West Africa and counter Chinese design[s] on African
mineral resources.”119
Today, U.S.–Africa trade and investment relationship are centered on the
African Growth and Opportunity Act (“AGOA”). 120 The Act, renewed in
2015 to extend through 2025,121 gives exports from countries in SSA
preferential access to U.S. markets. 122 AGOA currently has forty
participating African countries. 123 For African countries to receive AGOA
benefits however, compliance with certain pre-set condition are necessary.
For example, “[t]he country must be making progress toward a marketbased economy, . . . elimination of trade barriers and systems to combat
corruption, and protection of worker’s rights.” 124 Furthermore, “AGOA has
had a mixed legacy, given its goal of growing Africa’s export markets
rather than building two-way trade and investment partnerships.”125 Also,
crude petroleum remains the dominant product traded between the U.S. and
115. Id. at 21.
116. Id. at 20–25
117. Priest, supra note 106 at 242.
118. Id. at 243.
119. Id. at 246.
120. Africa, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPS., https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa
(last visited Nov. 10, 2019) (providing basic information on the United States and Africa
Trade) [hereinafter USTR].
121. Id.
122. Brookings, supra note 93.
123. USTR, supra note 120.
124. Brookings, supra note 93.
125. Id.
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Africa “with 69 percent share of overall AGOA imports.”126 Thus, because
of the limited concentration of trade, very few countries and sectors in
Africa are able to meaningfully utilize the benefits of AGOA as a whole.
Trade between the U.S. and Africa has undergone a significant change in
recent years due to the discovery of shale oil in the U.S. As a result of the
oil discovery, the U.S. lifted a 40-year oil export ban put in place in the
1970s, after OPEC’s oil embargo against the U.S.127 Not long after, the
U.S. reclaimed its once lost independence and dominance in the oil
industry.128 After the U.S. mass production of shale, U.S. crude oil imports
from Africa took a significant plunge. “Crude oil exports from Africa to the
United States have fallen from a high of 2.4 million barrels a day in 2007 to
0.29 million barrels a day in 2014, which represents an 87.7 percent
decline.”129 The impact of the shale oil discovery and subsequent reduction
in Africa’s oil export to the U.S. has reverberated in Africa’s oil-dependent
economy. Though China and other countries have filled the gaping hole the
U.S. left, many African countries are still in search of a stable customer
base.130
Despite the reduction in African crude oil imports to the U.S., America’s
investments in Africa are still significant. For example, U.S. FDI in 2017
alone was $5.8 billion in Nigeria and $1.7 billion in Ghana. 131 Although a
lion chunk of America’s reduction of trade and investment in Africa is due
to shale energy boom, another underlying and long recurring reason is the
constant battle against corruption in Africa’s economy.
III. Corruption and Misuse of Investment
and Natural Resource Revenues In Africa
Although one would naturally expect the benefits of foreign investments
and revenue from Africa’s massive oil reserves to flow down to its
inhabitants, history indicates otherwise. Thus, there is a growing
126. USTR, supra note 120.
127. U.S. Spending Bill Lifts 40-year Ban on Crude Oil Exports, BBC NEWS, (Dec. 18,
2015) https://www.bbc.com/news/business-35136831.
128. CFR Timeline, supra note 101.
129. Nancy E. Brune, The Impact of the U.S. Shale Boom in Africa, JOURNAL OF INT’L
AFFAIRS (Jan. 1, 2016) https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/impact-u-s-shale-boom-africa.
130. Id.
131. Nigeria, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPS., https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/
africa/west-africa/nigeria (last visited Nov. 10, 2019); Ghana, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPS., https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/west-africa/ghana (last visited Nov. 10,
2019).
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resentment of many African citizens against government leadership.
“According to some estimates, . . . Africa is the only world region where
sustained economic growth in the coming years will not result in
meaningful poverty reduction; on the contrary, poverty is projected to rise.”
132
And corruption continues to impede the efforts of bringing Africa out of
poverty.
According to the Corruption Perception Index (“CPI”), a leading global
indicator of public sector corruption, countries in SSA displayed the highest
levels of corruption.133 The CPI included rankings for 180 of the 195
countries in the world. 134 On the list, Libya ranked 170 out of 180, Angola
ranked 166 out of 180, Nigeria ranked 144 out of 180, while Algeria and
Egypt tied for 105th out of 180 countries.
The pervasive nature of corruption in Africa has affected the public
perception on the possibilities for its eradication. Afrobarometer, a nonpartisan research network, conducted a public attitude survey on corruption
with a nationally represented survey sample of African citizens. 135 Thirtysix African countries were surveyed and key findings revealed that indeed
Africans are not oblivious to the wide-spread corruption that has become a
part of everyday life. 136The most popular reason why people do not report
corruption was “fear of the consequences (34%) and the expectation that
nothing will be done (14%).137
Further, many responders of the Afrobarometer surveys show corruption
has increased, and, among the types of elected or state officials viewed to
be corrupt, the police were most often cited. 138 For instance, “45% of
respondents say ‘most’ or ‘all’ police are involved in corruption…
government officials (38%) . . . judges and magistrates (34%), . . . officials
in the Presidency (31%) . . . .” 139

132. Oxford Energy Forum, supra note 16, at 27.
133. Corruptions Perceptions Index 2018, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, https://www.
transparency.org/files/content/pages/CPI_2018_Executive_Summary_EN.pdf (last visited
Nov. 10, 2019).
134. Id.
135. Thomas Isbell, Efficacy for fighting corruption: Evidence from 36 African countries,
AFROBAROMETER (July 3, 2017) https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/
Documents%20de%20politiques/ab_r6_policypaperno41_efficacy_for_fighting_corruption.
pdf.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2
139. Id.
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African countries’ rankings and survey reports indicate the breadth and
scope of corruption and shows that urgent change is necessary to set the
African economy back on the correct course. Indeed, even though most of
corruption is unreported, a majority of Africans (54%) still believe that
ordinary people can fight corruption. 140
A. Corruption Overview
There are many different definitions of corruptions. Because of
corruption’s wide scope, one definition does not seem to fully capture its
essence. For example, Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines corruption as a
“dishonest or illegal behavior especially by powerful people.” 141
Transparency International, a leading independent, non-governmental
organization that created the CPI, defines corruption as “the abuse of
entrusted power for private gain.” 142 The United Nations defined
corruption as an “insidious plague that has a wide range of corrosive effects
on societies.”143 Others have defined corruption to be “the diversion of
public resources to non-public purposes.” 144 The reality is there are
different varieties and typologies of corruption. And the impact of
corruption not only “corrodes the social fabric of society,”145 it also creates
a “distrustful and apathetic public.”146
Scholars have advanced different theories on corruption, one of which
includes four subtypes: (1) cost-reducing corruption; (2) cost-enhancing
corruption; (3) benefit-reducing corruption; and (4) benefit-enhancing
corruption.147 In all of these scenarios, corrupt individuals look for ways to
140. Id. at 1.
141. Corruption, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
corruption (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
142. .How Do You Define Corruption?, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, https://www.
transparency.org/what-is-corruption#define (last visited Nov. 10, 2019); see also Overview,
TRANSPARENCY INT’L, https://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation (last visited
Nov. 10, 2019)
143. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS
AND CRIME, https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/
08-50026_E.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2020) [Hereinafter The UN Convention].
144. John Mukum Mbaku, International Law and the Fight Against Bureaucratic
Corruption in Africa, 33 ARIZ. J. INT’ L & COMP. LAW 661, 667 (2016).
145. What is Corruption: What Are the Costs of Corruption?, TRANSPARENCY INT’L
https://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption#costs-of-corruption (last visited Nov. 10,
2019).
146. Id.
147. Mbaku, supra note 144, at 676 (examining a 1989 American Journal of Economics
and Sociology article written by Professor M. Shahid Alam).
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extract extra income for themselves. A cost-reducing type of corruption “is
a specific scheme developed by business bureaucrats to enhance their
ability to extract extralegal income from business enterprises” 148 In this
scheme, bureaucrats looks for ways to enhance and maximize its profits by
reducing the cost of government activities on a particular enterprise. 149 For
example, the bureaucrat can “reduce or eliminate the tax owed the state by a
business enterprise.”150 The bureaucrat rewards the civil servant doing the
leg work, and the cost saved through the illegal tax scheme, is then shared
among those who were involved. 151
Corruption in a cost-enhancing structure thrives where “there is excess
demand for a public good or services and the government is unwilling or
unable to increase supply.” 152 In this scenario, due to what is effectively a
perpetual shortage, a corrupt individual will extort extra payments from the
public seeking access to the goods or services. 153 Another type of example
on this structure is where bureaucrats illegally levy extra taxes on a
person’s property. 154 When the person is unable to pay the extra taxes, the
bureaucrat will seize the property for his personal use. 155
A benefit-enhancing corruption involves government agency transfer of
resources to the public, through administered programs, i.e. scholarship
funds.156 In this scheme, individuals who oversee these government
programs can “illegally transfer more resources to a beneficiary than the
[beneficiary] is entitled to receive.” 157 Here, the overseer profits by
allowing the recipient to exaggerate his actual needs, allowing the two to
share in the portion of the overpayment.158
In a benefit-reducing corruption, “civil servants seeking ways to enrich
themselves can illegally appropriate government benefits that are due other
citizens and make them their own. 159This type of corruption is quite
pervasive in African countries. 160 To use the scholarship fund scenario as an
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 11–12.
Id.
Id.
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example again, overseers of this program can delay the disbursement of the
scholarship by placing the money in a local or foreign bank to bear interest,
and then appropriate the interest earned for individual use. 161 Similarly, “the
head of a military battalion may steal some of the supplies and equipment
allocated to his unit and sell them in the open market, and keep the
proceeds for himself.”162
B. Linking the Battle for Oil to the Different Vehicles of Corruption
Within the different typologies of corruption, there are varied means by
which corruption is carried out: money laundering, nepotism, bribery, abuse
of power for private gain, patronage, siphoning of public funds, etc. 163 The
proliferation of these types of corruption did not occur overnight.
Corruption was once so deeply ingrained in the fabric of society, that its
existence was deemed perfectly normal and was just another facet of doing
business. Today, this standard cannot continue to be the case.
Corruption perpetuates poverty in Africa’s O&G industry, because many
of the benefits derived from oil never trickle down to ordinary citizens. This
is a reason why, despite the sheer amount of Africa’s natural resources,
poverty is expected to rise.164 Instead, the oil revenues continue to enrich
the so-called leaders and governmental actors. Thus, the elimination of
corruption in Africa’s O&G industry must be targeted. Eradication of
corruption in Africa’s oil industry if possible, will be noticeable in other
sectors and other nations, because the economy of many African nation
revolves around oil, and many African nations have international partners.
The battle against corruption is not just limited to Africa. Developed
countries and international companies with activities abroad also frequently
play a role. In fact, corruption was openly supported through business
practices. For example, “[p]rior to 1977 it was not unlawful for U.S.
companies to offer bribes to secure foreign contracts.”165 Also, until 1999,
certain “bribes paid abroad were technically tax deductible for German
companies . . . .” 166 Even today, a large portion of the illicit money
received by African government officials and leaders, “tend[s] to end up in
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See Mbaku, supra note 144; see generally Oxford Energy Forum, supra note 16.
164. Oxford Energy Forum, supra note 16, at 27.
165. Miller Seumas, Corruption, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/corruption/#VariCorr (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
166. Siemens: Corruption Made in Germany, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, https://www.
transparency.org/news/feature/25_corruption_scandals#Siemens (last visited Dec. 17, 2019).
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offshore accounts in countries such as Switzerland, or is invested in real
property in the developed countries.” 167
Over time, the U.S. and several European countries have implemented
different programs meant to tackle corruption. For example, in 1977,
Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), “making it
unlawful for certain classes of persons and entities to make payments to
foreign government officials to assist in obtaining or retaining business.”168
In addition, Britain updated its Bribery Act in 2010, to enhance Britain’s
law on bribery. The Bribery Act is “among the strictest legislation
internationally on bribery.”169 This is partly because Britain’s Bribery Act
employs a strict liability law.”170 As a result of this, on the day Britain
implemented the Act, “stock prices fell for companies doing business in
high-corruption countries . . . .”171
Corruption acts and programs have had their fair share of successes. For
example, in 2017 Halliburton agreed to pay a $29.2 million fine related to
payments made to a local Angolan company in exchange for winning oilfield contracts.172 In 2013, the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) charged Weatherford International, a Swiss-based oilfield service
company, with bribery and inappropriate spending on foreign officials in
order to win Middle East and African business. 173 In 2010, Royal Dutch
Shell was part of an SEC sweep to crack down on international public
companies engaged in corruption abroad.174 Shell International Exploration
and Production agreed to pay over $18 million when it violated the FCPA
by making illegal payments to Nigerian Custom Services to gain
preferential treatments related to its projects. 175 Yet, despite SEC’s actions
167. Mbaku, supra note 144, at 722.
168. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/
criminal-fraud/foreign-corrupt-practices-act (last visited Dec. 17, 2019).
169. The Bribery Act, TRANSPARENCY INT’L UK, https://www.transparency.org.uk/ourwork/business-integrity/bribery-act/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2019).
170. Id.
171. Rose Jacobs, How to Fight Corruption–And Why We Should,
CHICAGOBOOTHREVIEW (May 20, 2019), https://review.chicagobooth.edu/economics/2019/
article/how-fight-corruption-and-why-we-should.
172. SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, U.S. SEC.AND EXCH. COMM’N https://www.
sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last visited Dec. 17, 2019).
173. Id.
174. SEC Charges Seven Oil Services and Freight Forwarding Companies for
Widespread Bribery of Customs Officials, U.S. SEC.AND EXCH. COMM’N https://www.sec.
gov/news/press/2010/2010-214.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2019).
175. Id.
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to control corruption, the battle is far yet to be over. Different corruption
scandals continue in Africa’s O&G industry, sometimes with multinational
companies right at the center of it all.
1. The OPL 245 Scandal—Shell, Eni, and JPMorgan Chase Bank
Royal Dutch Shell, ranked third in the 2019 Fortune Global 500 list, is
an international oil company that has established its dominance in
production, exploration and refining of oil and other natural gases. 176 Eni,
an Italian company, is also an oil-producing supermajor with activities that
includes exploration, refinery and marketing etc. 177 JPMorgan Chase & Co.
(“Chase”) is a financial institution headquartered in the U.S. with a history
that spans over 200 years.178 Currently, Chase operates globally in more
than 60 countries worldwide, including Nigeria. 179
In 2018, JPMorgan Chase became involved in an ongoing, high-profile
lawsuit along with Shell and Eni, over an oil block sale (“OPL 245”) in
Nigeria made in 2011. 180 The Nigerian government filed a lawsuit
implicating Shell and Eni for perpetrating a scheme to pay over $1 billion
for an offshore oil block license. 181 Owners of the license will have
authority for oil exploration and other activities in the area. The money
allegedly never reached the Nigerian government. “The companies agree
the payment was made, but disagree[d] about whether those funds then
went to bribes.”182 According to the Nigerian government, the oil block
payment were instead made to Dan Etete, a convicted money launderer.
“Internal Shell emails, leaked to the press in 2017, reveal that senior
executives knew the massive payment for the oil block would go to
176. Who We Are, SHELL, https://www.shell.com/about-us/who-we-are.html (last visited
Dec. 17, 2019); see also Royal Dutch Shell, FORTUNE, https://fortune.com/global500/2019/
royal-dutch-shell (last visited Dec. 17, 2019).
177. How We Work, ENI, https://www.eni.com/en_IT/company/company-profile/howwe-work.page (last visited Dec. 17, 2019)
178. About Us, J.P.MORGAN, https://www.jpmorgan.com/country/US/en/about (last
visited Dec. 17, 2019).
179. Going Global, J.P.MORGAN, https://www.jpmorgan.com/country/US/en/jpmorgan/
about/history/month/dec (last visited Dec. 17, 2019).
180. Emily Flitter, JPMorgan’s Role in Nigerian Oil Deal Has Come Back to Haunt It,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/28/business/jpmorgannigeria.html.
181. Id.
182. Kelly Giblom, et al., Shell, Eni Officials Named in $1 Billion Nigeria Lawsuit,
BLOOMBERG (May 7, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-07/shelleni-executives-named-in-1-billion-nigeria-bribery-suit.
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Etete . . . .”183 Not surprisingly, Nigeria then separately implicated Chase in
the lawsuit for negligently carrying out the wire transfers.
Shell and Eni paid the initial $1.1 billion to a Chase bank account in
London, and soon after payments were made, Nigerian officials instructed
Chase to transfer the money to a Swiss bank account. 184 Chase transferred
the money from its London branch, but the money was promptly returned,
after the Swiss Bank cited compliance reasons due to the large amount. 185
Failing in its first attempt, Nigerian officials instructed Chase to send the
money to a bank in Lebanon instead. 186 The Lebanese bank also rejected the
payment due to a suspicion that the transfer was a money laundering
attempt.187 Finally, Chase was again instructed to transfer the money, this
time back to Nigeria, and into bank accounts owned by Etete. 188 The final
transfer was successful.
In the ongoing lawsuit, the Nigerian government claimed that the
rejection of the prior transfers should have been a clear red flag deterring
Chase from making the final transaction, regardless of what its instructions
were.189 Indeed, Chase flagged the transfers as suspicious to British
regulators, however, the British regulators warned Chase that though the
transfers were approved by the British government, that did not mean that
Chase would be “legally off the hook if problems with the transfers later
arose . . . .”190 This lawsuit is currently ongoing in Italy, and if the verdict is
favorable to Nigeria, the country will have the opportunity to appropriately
utilize the lost oil revenues for its people.
2. The Riggs Bank Scandal
Another example of corruption that has plagued Africa’s O&G industry
is illustrated by the Riggs Bank (“Riggs”) scandals that rocked the financial
industry in the early 2000s. Riggs Bank, before its acquisition by the PNC
Financial Services Group, operated out of Washington D.C., across the
street from U.S. Treasury department, for more than 100 years.191 At its
183. Introduction, SHELL AND ENI ON TRIAL, https://shellandenitrial.org/intro/ (last visited
Dec. 17, 2019).
184. Flitter, supra note 180.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. (quoting London court filings)
191. Elliot Carter, Riggs Bank Was “The Bank of Presidents” ARCHITECT OF THE
CAPITAL (Sept. 4, 2016), https://architectofthecapital.org/posts/2016/8/27/riggs-bank.
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prime, Riggs boasted an impressive clientele. “More than 20 U.S.
Presidents (ranging from Lincoln to Nixon) banked at Riggs . . . .” 192
Eventually, Riggs Bank’s dubious dealings with questionable international
political leaders, and its complacency in being a willing participant in fraud
and money laundering led to the bank’s downfall. 193
Before Riggs’ financial decline, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo
(“Obiang”), President of Equatorial Guinea (“E.G.”) for over forty years,
opened different accounts at Riggs in 1995. 194 E.G. is one of Africa’s rising
players in the oil industry. Revenue from the O&G industry accounts for
60% of E.G.’s GDP, and 86% of E.G.’s exports back in 2015. 195 Obiang’s
account with Riggs operated from 1995-2004 and amassed around $700
million in oil revenues before its closing. 196
The oil revenues in Obiang’s account were likely deposited from
different IOCs that invested in E.G. such as ExxonMobil, Chevron, and
Marathon Oil.197 “President Obiang and his close relatives maintained
signatory authority over many of the Riggs accounts and had complete
discretion over the use of those funds.” 198 It is highly doubtful that the
money in Riggs account and others like it ever benefited the people of E.G.
The SEC and the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation
launched a full inquiry into Riggs’ activities in connection to the bank’s
dealings with E.G. and other countries such as Chile, and Saudi Arabia. 199
In relation to Riggs dealings with E.G., the Senate investigation report
showed the extent of the illicit use of the Riggs funds. Riggs assisted
Obiang in opening up a shell company in the Bahamas, and Riggs accepted
$3 million in cash deposits from the account. 200 The Senate investigation
report further revealed that Riggs had ignored the accusations of corruption
and human rights violation within Obiang’s presidency. Instead, in a period
of two years, Riggs accepted a total of $13 million in cash for E.G., in
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Alex Vines, et. al, Well Oiled: Oil and Human Rights in Equatorial Guinea, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (July 9, 2009) https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bhr0709
web_0.pdf.
195. Equatorial Guinea, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN, (Dec. 2017), https://www.
eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.php?iso=GNQ.
196. Vines, et. al, supra note 194, at 21.
197. Id. at 18.
198. Id. at 21. (citing U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation’s 2004
report on Money Laundering and Foreign Corruption).
199. Id. at 24–25
200. Id. at 23.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020

632

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 5

“unopened plastic-wrapped bundles.”201 This action definitely aligns with
SEC’s statement that indeed, one of “the most obvious form of corrupt
payment is large amounts of cash.”202
Furthermore, the Senate Investigation team also revealed that six IOC
made significant payments to E.G. in the forms of scholarships.203 For
example, Chevron Corporation provided $150,000 each year between 2001
and 2004 for student training expenses; Hess made $1.9 million to fund
E.G.’s students studying in U.S. and Canada; and from 2003 to 2007,
Devon Energy paid $200,000 per year towards E.G.’s educational
training.204 The total amount of scholarships made to E.G. amounted to over
$4 million.205
Whether any of the scholarship money or other funds from the Riggs
accounts actually benefitted the people of E.G. given the unacceptable use
of funds, is highly doubtful. For example, the reputation of President
Obiang’s son, Teodorin Nguema Obiang (“Teodorin”), has been marred by
different corruption scandals due to his ostentatious lifestyle funded by the
oil revenue. Teodorin purchased luxury homes in multiple locations
including South Africa and Los Angeles. 206 Public records for the L.A.
home showed that it was worth around $35 million. 207
Eventually, Riggs pleaded guilty to different criminal charges and
violation of the U.S. Bank Secrecy Act and was fined $16 million. 208 The
$16 million fine was in addition to an earlier civil fine of $25 million, along
with different requirements imposed by the U.S. Federal Reserved aimed at
improving Riggs internal controls and risk management.209 After Riggs was
acquired by PNC Financial group, its international work with political
leaders was shut down, and its former headquarters went up for sale. 210 The
E.G. government on the other hand, is still struggling to be freed from the
strong grip of corruption in its economy.
201. Id.
202. Mbaku, supra note 144, at 725.
203. Vines, et. al, supra note 194, at 29.
204. Id. at 29–31.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 34–35.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 24–25.
209. Id.
210. Jonathan O’Connell, Former Riggs Bank Headquarters Near White House Goes Up
for Sale, WASH. POST, (Dec. 6, 2013) https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
capitalbusiness/former-riggs-bank-headquarters-near-white-house-goes-up-for-sale/2013/
12/06/f5802e0e-56cb-11e3-835d-e7173847c7cc_story.html.
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IV. Forward Looking View and Proposed Solutions to Combat Corruption
Indeed, Africa has a plethora of resources and a huge potential for
growth; however, until the spread of corruption is successfully contained,
progress will lag. It is important to fight corruption because of its
burdensome cost on the economy. The bottom line is that countries and
companies engaged in corruption, pay more. The cost can be in the form of
fines levied by the SEC or other regulatory bodies, or through delays by
companies because of their increased caution in evaluating deals with
corrupt countries, or it can be in the form of missing benefits for
Africans.211 According to a 2015 report from the United Nations Economic
Commissions for Africa, “African countries have lost more than $1 trillion
in official payments since the 1970s through bribery of government
officials . . . other illicit practices . . . .” 212 And more than 75% of the
missing payment can be linked to some activities in the O&G sector. 213
It is clear that corruption is a lose-lose scenario for all parties involved,
thus combatting corruption should not be left to African nations alone. To
tame this beast, all hands must be on deck, at the same time. As a result,
proposed solutions to combat corruption are different depending on which
actor is involved. Solutions can be viewed through the lenses of IOCs and
multinational companies, partner countries, African youths, and judicial
independence. If one actor/side were to act alone, the effects of those
actions would be minimal and would likely be counteracted by actions from
other actors. Instead, there should be a collaborative effort by all parties in
Africa’s O&G economy.
A. Different Actors and Their Roles in Curtailing the Spread of Corruption
1. International Oil Companies and Multinational Companies
Connections between oil production and human rights abuses and
corruption is not uncommon. For example, in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co, Ken Saro-Wiwa led a non-violent movement to protest the
social and ecological effect of Shell’s activities in his Ogoni community in
Nigeria. In response to the opposition, Shell allegedly aided the Nigerian
police in military attacks to quell the opposition. In the end, Wiwa and his
team were arrested, tortured, and ultimately hanged.214 Plaintiffs in the

211.
212.
213.
214.

Jacobs, supra note 171.
Id.
Id.
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2000).
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Wiwa case were Nigerian emigres who were next of kin to the victims. 215
They sought damages from Shell under the Racketeering Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act, the Alien Torts Claims Act, and international
law and treaties. 216 At the height of the controversy, Shell remained
complacent and chose to be a bystander instead of intervening on behalf of
Wiwa or his team, despite Shell’s huge influence in the Ogoni
community.217 Implicit in the Wiwa complaints filed was that from the
death of Wiwa and his team, Shell stood to benefit.
First, in order for IOCs and multinational companies to fight corruptions
and other cases like Wiwa, all companies must be more forthcoming and
transparent with their overseas activities. Complacency is no longer an
option. Corruption thrives in the dark, so the more light shed on companies’
international activities, the more likely its accountability. Second,
companies should implement anti-corruption programs. And if such
programs are already in place, the companies should publish their follow up
mechanisms.218
With regard to country transparency, a detailed country level disclosure
from companies (IOCs in particular) for all their international activities will
ensure clarity and honesty in the companies reported reveune. 219 The more
transparent IOCs are, the more African citizens will be able to hold their
leaders accountable for the way oil revenues are being spent and disbursed.
For example, President Obiang’s dictator-like governance survived off of
oil riches from E.G. Additionally, the Riggs Scandal and the payments
made to the Riggs account were misused for so long partly because of the
lack of transparency.
Disclosure is not just limited to revenues, but should also entail contract
transparency as well. For example, the aforementioned ‘scholarship
payments’ made to E.G. by national companies were all part of a contract
those companies signed with the E.G. government. 220 The extent of the use
of the scholarship money as well as the names of students who benefited
215. Id.
216. Id. at 93
217. See generally Martin-Joe Ezeudu, Revisiting corporate violations of human rights in
Nigeria’s Niger Delta region: Canvassing the potential role of the International Criminal
Court, 11 AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS L.J. 23, 35 (2011), http://www.scielo.org.za/pdf/
ahrlj/v11n1/03.pdf.
218. Promoting Revenue Transparency: 2011 Report on Oil and Gas Companies,
TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Feb. 27, 2011) https://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/
prt2011?backgroundColor=%2523222222. [hereinafter TI Revenue Transparency].
219. Id.
220. Vines, et. al, supra note 194, at 29.
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should be available to the public to ensure that the money is not a front for
bribes, because scholarship funds can easily be manipulated in a benefitenhancing or benefit-reducing type of corruption. 221
To further this vision of transparency and disclosure, some IOCs are a
member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives (“EITI”). EITI
was launched in 2002, and is the “global standard to promote the open and
accountable management of oil, gas and mineral resources.” 222 This means
that EITI encourages disclosures of all oil and gas payments made to the
government or received by government. EITI data covers the location of
natural resources, from revenue collection, revenue allocation, and extends
to the point where the revenues are converted to public benefit. 223 So far, 52
countries have implemented the EITI standard, including many of Africa’s
largest O&G producers.224
EITI’s main focus is the public access to information which would
hopefully foster debate and discussion in the public sphere; however, there
is still room for growth as some data required by the EITI could be
expanded. 225 According to Transparency International, a recommendation
to combat corruption is for IOCs to have a more detailed disclosure
(country by country) of operating reserves and production data, as well as
income statements. 226 Providing this information should thoroughly
address issues related to revenue transparency.
Regarding the second point, IOCs and national companies should
implement anti-corruption programs, and if already in place, progress made
with such programs should be disclosed. 227 Having an anticorruption
program will ensure that combatting corruption is a primary goal of senior
executives and employees in international companies. By actively
maintaining an anti-corruption program, companies will be able to more
accurately comply with their own standards. The anti-corruption programs
should not only include companies’ policy and stance on corruption, but
should also include management systems created for reporting incidents. 228
221.
222.
223.
224.

See Mbaku, supra note 144.
Who We Are, EITI, https://eiti.org/who-we-are (last visited Dec. 17, 2019).
Id.
The Global Standard for the Good Governance of Oil, Gas and Mineral Resources,
EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, https://eiti.org/files/documents/eiti_fact
sheet_en_09.2019.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 2019).
225. Id.
226. TI Revenue Transparency, supra note 218 at 6.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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Performance and the number of reported incidents should also be monitored
and evaluated by company leaders.
Overall, the role IOCs and national companies play is crucial. “One of
the most important foreign suppliers of corruption in the continent is the
multinational company, which is seeking to influence public officials in
order to have access to either government contract or conduct.” 229 This is
also evident via the various SEC takedowns of multinational companies
who violated the FCPA. Thus, because of the crucial role IOCs and
multinational companies play through their activities abroad, these
companies’ full cooperation is needed in order to curtail the spread of
corruption in Africa’s O&G industry.
2. Partner Countries
President Obiang wrote the following in his book: “discovery of oil in
Equatorial Guinea . . . have completely changed the attitude of many of our
partners . . . Suddenly, they have become more permissive.” 230 This quote
is not the only indicator that partner countries are increasingly turning a
blind eye to allegations of corruption and human right violations suspected
of African leaders, due to the economies of the oil industry. Many accused
violators elude justice by fleeing to neighboring African countries or
international communities.
The United Nations General Assembly recognized the dangers
complacency in addressing corruption in partner countries poses, and thus
formed the United Nations Convention against Corruption (“UN
Convention”). The UN Convention was a “global response to a global
problem” that was predicated on international consensus. 231 The UN
Convention’s treaty was enforceable in 2005 and as of 2019 included over
180 participating countries known as State Parties. 232 The treaty “addresses
the cross-border nature of corruption with provisions on international
cooperation and on the return of the proceeds of corruption.”233 The UN
Convention addresses five main areas: cooperation at an international level,

229. Mbaku, supra note 144, at 743.
230. Vines, et. al, supra note 194, at 87 (citing President Obiang’s book My Life For My
People).
231. Hannes Hechler, et. al, UNCAC in a Nutshell 2019, U4 ANTI-CORRUPTION
RESOURCE CENTER https://www.u4.no/publications/uncac-in-a-nutshell-2019 (last visited
Jan. 26, 2020).
232. Id.
233. Id.
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asset recovery, preventative measures, technical assistance and information
exchange. 234
In addressing asset recovery measures, the UN Convention recognized
the role that other particularly developed countries, have in inadvertently
aiding the continuation of corruption. Often times, suspected corrupt
leaders and human right violators who have looted their countries
resources, ‘invest’ those resources in foreign economies. This investment is
done either by buying assets in developed countries, or by storing their
illicit gains in offshore accounts. “[M]any of the top-level African civil
servants and political elites who engage in grand corruption in African
countries often use the United States, the European Union, and various
offshore banking locations (especially in Switzerland) as the preferred
destination for their ill-gotten gains.”235 Furthermore, reports have shown
that “as much as 30% of African financial wealth is estimated to be held
offshore, costing an estimated $14bn (£10bn) in lost tax revenues every
year.”236 The UN Convention recognized the role all countries play in
fighting international corruption and thus included provisions for the
extradition of suspected criminals and the return of looted assets. 237
The UN Convention is a step in the right direction, however, it is not
without its limitations. The UN Convention contains many non-mandatory
provisions.238 These provisions, coupled with loose norms and terms, have
resulted in the UN Convention’s restrained ability to influence the legal
systems of its signatories.239 As a result, some countries are using the UN
Convention as a way to avert criticism. By being a participating member of
the UN Convention, countries placate the investor communities and others
alike, while actually doing little to implement the UN Convention’s
provisions.240 Implementing a higher level of scrutiny regarding each
country’s review and implementation process against corruption may go a
long way in correcting some of UN Convention’s weaknesses. 241 The
bottom line is that there must be an effective sanction in place for those in
234. The UN Convention, supra note 143.
235. Mbaku, Fight Against Bureaucratic Corruption, supra note 144 at 715.
236. Anton du Plessis, Corruption in Africa Violate Human Rights. Why Do We Tolerate
It? THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/
2016/sep/16/corruption-africa-violates-human-rights-fuels-radicalism-why-do-we-tolerate-it.
237. The UN Convention, supra note 143 at 30.
238. Hechler, et. al,, supra note 231 at 22-23.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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violation of the UN Convention’s provisions to limit corruption in the
international forum.
International instruments alone, such as the UN Convention, will not
suffice in combatting corruption issues in Africa. Neighboring partner
countries in Africa also have their roles to play. In recognition of this, the
Africa Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (“AU
Convention”) was implemented in 2006. 242 The AU Convention listed
concerns about the “negative effects of corruption and impunity on the
political, economic, social and cultural stability of African States . . . .” 243
One of AU Convention’s objectives is to “prevent, detect, and punish, and
eradicate corruption and related offences in the public and private sectors.”
244
In effect, the AU Convention criminalizes acts such as illicit enrichment,
money laundering, foreign bribery, and urges transparency in the
management and conduction of public affairs. 245
Over 40 countries have ratified and consented to the provisions of the
AU Convention. 246 The AU Convention suffers similar woes that plagues
much of the UN Convention. In addition, honest tracking and accurate
enforcement of the AU Convention’s provisions are more complex because
much of its participating members are personally entrenched in corruption.
Nevertheless, both the AU and UN Convention are great indicators that
minimizing corruption is not a war that can be fought alone. Instead,
battling corruption takes a coordinated effort from domestic and
international allies.
3. African Youths
The gargantuan number of Africa’s youth cannot be ignored. The 2015
United Nations estimates stated that there were 1.2 billion youth in

242. African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, July 11,
2003, 43 I.L.M. 5, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36382-treaty-0028_-_african_
union_convention_on_preventing_and_combating_corruption_e.pdf.
243. Id. at 2.
244. Id. at 5.
245. See generally id. (Article 6 discusses illicit enrichment, Article 8 tackles money
laundering, Article 11 encourages prevention of bribes, and Article 12 indicates a
commitment to transparency).
246. List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified /Acceded to The Africa Union
Convention on Preventing and Combatting Corruption, AFRICAN UNION, (Oct. 29, 2019)
https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36382-sl-AFRICAN%20UNION%20CONVENTION
%20ON%20PREVENTING%20AND%20COMBATING%20CORRUPTION%20%281%2
9.pdf.
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Africa.247 Rephrased, African youth alone, aged 15-24, represents
approximately 17% of the world’s population. 248 This number will continue
to grow. By 2055, the 2015 estimate of Africa’s youth is expected to more
than double.249 Statistics show that by 2030, youth of working age in Africa
will amount to 375 million people—the combined population of U.S. and
Canada. 250
While African youth population is an indicator of opportunities and new
talents to come, Africa’s youth population in light of the continent’s current
political and socio-economic status, poses many risk and challenges. The
oil industry in Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, and others are undoubtedly
controlled by politicians. For example, there are many state-controlled
companies in Africa, like Sonangol, that were created to manage the
country’s vast oil supply. Yet, despite the large number of African youths,
the youth are widely underrepresented in Africa’s governance.
“[T]he average age of an African president is 62, while the median age
of Africa’s population is 19.5.” 251 Former president of Zimbabwe, Robert
Mugabe, was the oldest President in Africa at the age of 94. 252 He held the
presidency for 37 years before his replacement came to power. 253 Northwest
of Zimbabwe lies Cameroon, whose current President is Paul Biya, age
86.254 Biya has been in power since 1982.255 Many of Africa’s nations are
democratic on paper, yet in reality, many leaders abuse power. Corruption
and shady tactics are implicit in the tenure of many of these leaders as they
‘win’ their re-election year after year.

247. Youth Empowerment, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISER ON AFRICA, https://www.un.
org/en/africa/osaa/peace/youth.shtml (last visited Jan. 26, 2020).
248. Id.
249. .Mohamed Yahya, Africa Defining Challenge, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMME (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.africa.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/blog/2017/
8/7/africa_defining_challenge.html.
250. Landre Signe, Africa Youth Leadership: Building Local Leaders to Solve Global
Challenges, BROOKINGS (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-infocus/2019/03/27/africa-youth-leadership-building-local-leaders-to-solve-global-challenges/
251. Yahya, supra note 249.
252. Sebastiane Ebatamehi, The 15 Oldest Presidents in Africa 2018, THE AFRICAN
EXPONENT (Oct. 20, 2018), https://www.africanexponent.com/post/9292-africa-a-youngcontinent-with-old-leaders.
253. Id.
254. AFP, World’s Oldest Leaders, THE EAST AFRICAN (July 25, 2019), https://www.
theeastafrican.co.ke/news/world/Worlds-oldest-leaders/4552918-5210226-114msumz/index.
html.
255. Id.
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Power consumes and power corrupts. The hesitation of Africa’s leaders
to step away from the helm of leadership is further indication of the
intoxicating effects absolute power has on the mind. Africa’s aging leaders
continue to make decisions, while its fledging youth are forced to live with
the consequences.256 Because of the pervasiveness of corruption in the
African economy, today’s African youths must reckon with the reality of
corruption being a normal occurrence in almost every facet of life. A
change is needed, because governance in Africa cannot be left alone to its
current leaders.
In order to combat the spread of corruption in Africa’s O&G industry,
Africa’s youths must assume a more active role in the political process of
their respective countries. The younger generation can contribute to the
strengthening of democracy in Africa’s governing bodies. There must be an
inclusion of youth, even at the presidential level. “Policy makers forget that
youth are the backbone of any socioeconomic and political
development.”257
The wheels of change are already set in motion. For example, youth led
movements such as Senegal’s Y’en a marre, and Burkina Faso’s Balai
Citoyen, are prime indicators of African youth’s ability to reinforce
constitutional accountability in its leaders. 258 Youth led movements have
quickly become a beacon of hope for many of Africa’s younger
generations, partly because of the movement’s effects and ability to correct
the poverty-stricken image of Africa. “These civil society movements are a
breath of fresh air compared to the drab and essentially interchangeable
political classes.” 259
There are many African youth initiatives. For example, there are
initiatives like Africa for Africa Youths in Action and Africa Youth
Initiative Network that work to prioritize the needs of African youth, and
correct the detrimental effect of some governmental policies. 260 However,
African countries must not only create and maintain programs for its youth
256. Signe, supra note 250.
257. Busani Bafana, African Youth Demand a Seat at the Table, AFRICA RENEWAL (July
2018)
https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april-2018-july-2018/african-youthdemand-seat-table.
258. Signe, supra note 250.
259. Hamidou Anne,Young African: Reinventing Politics, U.N. EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC
AND CULTURAL ORG., https://en.unesco.org/courier/2018-2/young-africans-reinventingpolitics (last visited Jan. 26, 2020).
260. See About Us, AFRICA FOR AFRICA, https://africaforafrica.org/about/about (last
visited Jan. 26, 2020); see also Steve R. AYINET Use of Funds, AFRICAN YOUTH INITIATIVE
NETWORK https://africanyouthinitiative.org/about-us/
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leaders, it must also utilize the talents already available in many of these
initiatives. It is not enough to create an initiative that sparks dialogue, these
initiatives must be taken to the next level. There must be intentional steps
taken to tap into the talent pool of many African youth leaders, and
integrate them into governmental institutions. Power must be pried open
from the close-fisted hands of Africa’s entrenched leaders; the current
governmental body should give room for fresh ideas.
4. Judicial Independence
Judicial independence is the ability of courts and legal actors to make
decisions and perform their duties outside the influence of others. 261 While
defining judicial independence is relatively simple in theory, achieving
judicial independence in reality is more complex. Across the SSA, undue
influence in the judicial system is widespread. “[T]he type of judicial
independence that is widely considered both the most important and the
most difficult to achieve is independence from other governmental actors.”
262
This seems to be the case especially in Africa, because several of its
suspected corrupt leaders continue to evade judicial reprimand. Phrases
like “why pay a lawyer when you can buy a judge” are not uncommon, and
has effectively made the practice of law laughable in some areas. 263 Simply
put, the justice system cannot be another tool controlled by corrupt elites.
Achieving judicial independence in the SSA to fight against corruption is
especially important yet very difficult. Across the SSA, African courts often
encounter undue interference, many of which takes place informally. 264 For
instance, interference with justice systems takes the form of verbal or
physical threats against judges, biased judges’ appointment, bribery,
retaliatory attacks against judges, intimidations, influence pedaling, and
abuse of court procedures. 265 Another major reason that impedes the stride
toward judicial independence in Africa is the antiquated colonial design
261. David S. Law, Judicial Independence, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.
britannica.com/topic/judicial-independence (last visited Jan. 26, 2020).
262. Id.
263. Herbert A. Igbanugo, The Rule of Law, Judicial Corruption, and the Need for
Drastic Judicial Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa’s Nation, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
(Nov. 8, 2018) https://www.americanbar.org/groups/international_law/publications/
international_law_news/2013/summer/the_rule_of_law_judicial_corruption_need_for_drasti
c_judicial_reform_sub_saharan_africas_nation/.
264. Charlotte Heyl, The Judiciary and the Rule of Law in Africa, OXFORD RESEARCH
ENCYCOLPEDIAS, https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.
0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-1352 (last visited Jan. 26, 2020).
265. Id.; see also Igbanugo, supra note 263.
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flaw in African government, where the president has power over the
appointment, promotion and removal of judges.266 One approach to mitigate
this is to “institute a council of judicial personnel who are solely
responsible for the selection and appointment of judges”, instead of vesting
the power solely in the executive branch. 267
Without the coordinated efforts of the justice system to hold leaders
accountable, corruption in Africa will continue to thrive. It is the right time
for a judicial reform to take place across justice systems in Africa. Judges
must be empowered to make impartial decisions free from undue influence
from politics and other government branches. The role of Africa’s justice
system in the fight against corruption is simply too sacrosanct to be
ignored.
Conclusion
The O&G discoveries in Africa launched Africa into the limelight, and
contributed to the continent’s display of power on the world stage.
However, corruption in the O&G sector continues to threaten progress in
Africa. Although corruption in this industry might seem like an isolated
event, reality differs. O&G practices in Africa have wide-reaching effects in
other nations as well as other sectors. This is why there must be a concerted
effort from all parties involved to eliminate corruption.

266. Carmel Rickard, Crucial Meeting on Judicial Independence in Africa: June 2 - 6,
2019, AFRICAN LEGAL INFO. INST. (May 23, 2019) https://africanlii.org/article/20190523/
crucial-meeting-judicial-independence-africa-june-2-6-2019.
267. Igbanugo, supra note 263.
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